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Abstract. The book, Great Divergence and Great Convergence:  A Global Perspective, 
represents an insightful analysis of the processes associated with historical change, 
specifically those processes that have given rise to the current state of the world system.  
Uniquely, the authors suggest that continuity of process extends to both the Divergence and 
Convergence.  Further, they suggest that the time depth of the origin of this process is much 
deeper than the traditional marker of the mid-17
th
 Century and build a strong case for this 
assessment.  Finally, Grinin and Korotayev make some predictions regarding the further 
effects of the process of convergence into the near future, predictions suggesting a 
significant reshuffling of world system organization and the rise of a global middle class. 
Keywords. Economic growth, Convergence, Globalization. 
JEL. E01, F60, O47,  
 
Book Review 
n the early years of the 21
st
 Century humanity faces both promise and also a 
precarious set of conditions, conditions which span the range of domains from 
environmental degradation, through socio-political upheaval, to economic 
downturn.  Our sense of promise comes from the diversity of humanity currently 
present on the earth, the creativity and ingenuity endemic in that diversity, and the 
potential quality of life that has already been achieved for 60% or so of the global 
population, a quality of life that may be a real possibility for many more.  This 
current status of the world system of course has a history and, as just mentioned, 
and a double-edged potential for the future as well as a complex presence. 
Our present level of complexity, perhaps even hyper-complexity, depends ona 
mix of ingenuity, the availability of historically unique sources of energy, and a 
level of technological expertise and interconnectedness that is both without 
precedence and ultimately quite fragile.  Inspecting this complexity more closely 
reveals however a trichotomy of existence.  Unquestionably, there are at present 
those states that are hegemonic dominants, the U.S. and Western Europe, and 
linked to this group, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Then below this group are 
those countries with increasing hegemonic influence, specifically the BRICS states 
of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, a group that constitutes two 
demographic giants, China and India, and has the lion’s share of the earth’s natural 
resources, and finally there is the remainder of the planet’s 196 states, many in 
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Africa and South East Asia, some on the rise, but the majority of this group still 
economically, politically, and socially vulnerable. Interestingly, the pattern of 
change that has brought the world system to its current state has been occurring for 
some time and has involved significant changes in the influence of groups of 
polities over the past thousand or so years, the most significant of which is the rise 
to dominance of the West over the last 200 years and the current resurgence of the 
East. 
All of this poses a number of important questions for historians, economists, 
demographers, macro-sociologists, and interested scholars in general.  How did we 
come to be in this current set of circumstances?  What roles did, do, and will trends 
in economics, socio-political processes, demographic growth, technology, and 
culture play in creating the circumstances that were, are, and will be the states of 
the world system? What were the limits to the world-system as it evolved to its 
present state?  What are the current limits on the system, and what limits will 
canalize its future trajectory?Over time was the developing state of the world 
system a consequence of processual continuity, or are there disjunctions within the 
time course of the development of the world system? If there are disjunctions or at 
least periods of rapid change in the trajectory of the world system, what is the 
nature of these periods of heightened change?  How similar are they to the phase 
changes of the physical world, and what is the level of predictability that can be 
brought to bear on our understanding of their significance to the world 
system?And, clearly there are many more questions that could be specified. 
Bringing academic focus to the development of the world system, the imprint of 
the depth of time on that development, the complexity of events occurring over that 
depth of time, the current status of the system, and its future potential trajectories 
requires skill, insight, intelligence, and creativity.  To this end, Leonid Grinin and 
Andrey Korotayev have written a remarkable book, Great Divergence and Great 
Convergence: A Global Perspective, and represent an authorship team which is 
exceptionally well adapted to the task.  Leonid Grinin is the author of over three 
hundred papers, well over twenty monographs,is the Director of the Volgograd 
Center for Social Research, is the Deputy Director of the Eurasian Center for Big 
History and System Forecasting, and has a breadth of experience in macrosocial 
and historical researchall of which make him very well equipped to the task of 
analysis of the world system changes over the last millennium.  Andrey Korotayev 
also has a varied background with multiple interests ranging from social 
anthropology, to macrosocial dynamics, to the spectral analysis of Kondratief 
waves.  He is the Head of the laboratory of Monitoring of the Risks of 
Sociopolitical Destabilization, is also a Senior Research  Professor with both the 
Center for Big History and System Forecasting and the Institute for African Studies 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences.  However, for me what sets him apart is his 
mastery of math modeling of macrosocial processes, a topic that will be dealt with 
in more detail later. 
Grinin and Korotayev take the position that the roots of the Great Divergence 
are much deeper than the middle of the 18
th
 Century and mark that beginning of the 





 Centuries when there was a clear medieval industrial revolution, reduced in 
scale from the industrial revolution of the 18
th
 Century, and this revolution moved 
the West into a mode of convergence with the at the time far superior East. This 
process took over two centuries and involved improvements in technology and 
science which had the effect of elevating the environmental carrying capacity of 
the West. What followed then was a three phase transition in which the final phase 
is comparable to the traditional description of the Industrial Revolution and the 
motive force for the Great Divergence of the West over the East.  The initial phase 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
JEPE, 2(3), T. Harper, p.428-433. 
430 
of this process began in the Early  Modern period extending from about 1450 CE to 
the1660’s and characterized by significant epidemic impact, socio-political 
destabilization, and the second phase from the 1600’s to approximately 1760 CE, 
which is characterized by agrarian innovation and proto-globalization.   
In their discussion of the influence of the Early Modern Period on the Great 
Divergence Grinin and Korotayev recognize the multifaceted processes of this time 
and coin the term, catching up divergence, to very accurately describe specific 
changes within this mosaic of processes that led to western convergence with the 
East. The implication of this term is that, while the West in the totality of 
comparison with the East was clearly behind, the actual convergence of the West 
with the East was brought about by the evolved superiority of the West in specific 
areas which brought about the ultimate and complete divergence. Examples of 
these changed or evolved areas are improved techniques in metal cutting, 
improvements in water wheel technology, and significant changes in military 
technology to name just three. These improvements all fall within the context of 
improved efficiency of labor, and there were also improvements in the efficient use 
of “biological energy”, explicitly “in industry, in commerce, in accounting, and in 
other areas”. The authors make the point by asking how many hours of human 
labor were saved by the invention of the printing press.  In these specific areas of 
divergence then, the convergence of the West with the East was brought about.  
One further point, toward the end of this Early Modern Period the rapid increase in 
wealth of the West due to the acquisition of precious metals from the New World, 
which both increased the flow of goods from the East and also helped develop an 
incipient middle class in the West. 
The period from 1600 CE to 1760 CE was uniquely characterized by in 
particular three factors, the role of the periphery in the West versus the non-role of 
the periphery in the East, the adoption of an isolationist policy by the East, 
particularly China and Japan, and an increased rate of both western invention and 
innovation and the diffusion of those inventions and innovations in the West. 
Along with these changes, the further increase in agricultural technology released 
rural workers who could then increase the ranks of the urbanized.  It is interesting 
that while this process had begun in the Early Modern Period, it also fueled 
invention and innovation by increasing the number of small urbanized areas, a 
process in which localized invention could then spread through the connectedness 
of this web of partially autonomous urban areas. This pattern is reminiscent of the 
structure of a meta-population of organisms and how mutation originating in one 
local population might spread through the remainder of the population via gene 
flow.  In this case, the flow of ideas and material inventions and innovations are 
analogous to the flow of genetic material. 
The traditional view of the beginning of the Industrial Revolution actually 
represents the beginning of the final phase of this process of divergence as 
represented by Grinin and Korotayev, and while the steam engine reigns supreme 
as the quintessential mechanism associated with the Industrial Revolution, in fact 
the processes of continual mechanization, the continual expansion of machine 
application, and the freedom from direct reliance on water power which allowed 
the location of factories away from water sources ultimately focused on making 
labor more and more efficient. It has been calculated that four million British 
laborers with the aid of steam could produce the labor of six hundred million 
laborers without the aid of steam. 
During the final phase of the Great Divergence the authors recognize two 
somewhat separate divergence trajectories, that of Britain and Western Europe and 
that of the United States.  They show quite graphically between 1880 and 1910 that 
the divergence experienced by the United States was effectively exponential with 
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respect to any improvement in the East, while Britain was almost linear in its 
increase.  Also, China, Japan, Turkey, and Egypt did manage to improve, they did 
not have the success of the West, and only Japan was able to make significant steps 
toward catching up with the West. It is suggested that chief among the inhibitory 
factors for China was its immense population and the burden that the magnitude of 
this population placed on change.  It effectively extinguished change in light of the 
fact that because human labor was so abundant there was no motivation to invent 
and innovate. 
There are two other factors that are mentioned having a profound effect on the 
final stages of divergence. They are the establishment of legal protection for 
intellectual property, in other words, the establishment of patent law, which was 
particularly well developed in England, and the process of globalization which 
continues even today and is also part-and-parcel of the Great Convergence.  
Globalization of course began with the Age of Discovery, was motivated by 
advanced naval technology, and supplied the Old(er) World with trade routes 
which spread materials, genes, ideas, and in some instances, disease.  Regarding 
this last, one has only to consider the impact of food goods, specifically the potato, 
which initially was a nutritional opportunity which became a nutritional necessity, 
and was exceeded by a fungal potato blight causing significant famine in Europe, 
specifically in Ireland.  Syphillus, TB, and smallpox also come to mind as diseases 
spread by trade.  
While globalization was a key factor in the end game and near-end game of the 
Great Divergence, it also set the stage for the Great Convergence, the convergence 
of the East with the West, and the overriding model used by Grinin and Korotayev 
to explain the Great Divergence incorporates this.  Ecological succession is a 
process by which each successional stage sets the conditions for the establishment 
of the next successional stage, and much like ecological succession Grinin and 
Korotayev describe the collective processes associated with the Great Divergence 
as setting the stage for each phase of the divergence and also the convergence that 
the world system now is in.  It is their skillful use of data and their creative insight 
that brings this overall pattern to the fore.    
The current state of the world system according to a variety of scholars clearly 
exhibits the characteristics of a divergent system. This position is supported by a 
diversity of data ranging from that based on cross-sectional studies of the 
distribution of world GDP to changes in imperfect capital mobility to evidence of 
international per capita output. The book makes the point, however, that the 
evidence of similar patterns of both changing shares in the world system GDP and 
changing rates of population growth imply a system wide behavior and one that 
represents a process of convergence.  Further, using data sets that compare the 
“West with the Rest” initially over extended periods of time but with reduced time 
spans to show the magnified effects of change, the authors demonstrate very 
clearly that convergence is in fact occurring between the West and the rest of the 
world since the 1960’s.   
The world system is then treated as a tripartite system in which astute graphical 
comparisons are made between the first world, the second world, and the third 
world. While this terminology has its roots in the cold war period, its functional 
worth becomes clear when it is demonstrated that the second world, i.e. those 
countries previously within the Soviet domain, very clearly had a significant 
economic downturn in the 1990’s shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which as a consequence actually had the effect of causing a relative convergence 
between the first and third worlds.  These graphical comparisons are done using 
both GDP percentages and a scale based on the status of the high income countries 
at 2000 CE.  
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In turn, when the world system is divided into high, middle, and low income 
countries, the evidence for convergence is parsed out more clearly.  This point is 
further strengthened in a statistical addendum in which through temporal 
comparisons it is shown that it is the middle income countries that have converged 
significantly with the high income countries.  Further, the high income countries, 
the so-called golden billion, are increasing in population, as are middle income 
countries due to both a positive rate of growth and the movement of some low 
income countries into the middle income category. This condition may well have a 
short lifespan in that while the low income countries are contributing relatively 
little to the process [?] and their collective numbers are declining for the moment, 
but due to a combination of deficient education, relatively high and increasing birth 
rate, and a reduced economic output the future of the low income countries is not 
particularly rosy. The authors warn of a potential dampening of the current 
convergence process.  
The formal portion of the book closes with a forecast into the near future and 
suggests that the near-term will be characterized by three factors: a. The world 
system will be subject to changing rules with respect to the functioning of its 
component states and will also become more flexible in response to perturbations.  
b. States will align and realign as their needs and context continually change.  c. 
The sovereignty of individual states will become reduced as the sovereignty of 
alliances and blocks of states and also of supranational organizations increases.  
This near-future will be relatively unstable as states, groups of states, and other 
institutional entities jostle for position and as, while the hegemony of the U.S. will 
continue to decline, there is no one state capable of meeting all the characteristics 
of a dominant hegemon and adopting that role.  Consequently, the U.S. will 
continue as world hegemon for the near-time but will do so with reduced influence. 
Changes in world system disposition will be a consequence of both changes in 
external state relationships and changes within individual states.  Uneven 
development of individual states, ethnic changes within countries, perhaps a 
consequence of current and future patterns of migration as well as endemic changes 
within any given state, and changing levels of activity within the world system will 
all contribute ultimately to a new world system configuration.  Also involved will 
be the process of globalization; during this near-term phase economic globalization 
will lead but will be followed by political and socio-cultural globalization as well. 
Of particular interest is the role that technological innovation will play as the 
Great Convergence moves past the present. First, the authors suggest that the 
current information technology paradigm is nearly exhausted, but they see no 
chance for a new paradigm emerging until 2030 due to the current level of 
convergence, i.e. the actual process of convergence must proceed and is a 
prerequisite for further paradigmatic inventiveness to both occur and spread. This 
is due both to the time required for the diffusion of ideas but also because new 
paradigms won’t be accepted until old paradigms have completely equilibrated.  
While the book is less than sanguine about the stability of the near future in light of 
the Great Convergence, the reader is left with a sense of promise, because during 
this period of continuing convergence the world system middle class will grow and 
represents the potential for the development of “panhuman ideas” and new 
possibilities for globalization and the reconfiguration of the world system. 
A further comment is necessary here to discuss the appendices, particularly 
Appendix B.  Both appendices are exceptionally functional, but a comment is due 
specifically on the mathematical models represented in Appendix B. The math is 
due to the efforts of Andrey Korotayev, is a development, or rather, and expansion, 
of a previous model developed by Andrey in 2006. He is a pre-eminent math 
modeler of processes that are specifically associated with macrosociology, devises 
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elegant, simple models that help to clarify thought, and whose models are designed 
to emphasize conceptual understanding and have very clear worth of prediction.  
For those who use mathematical models and for those who appreciate the clarity 
and focus that math models bring to the study of any problem, Appendix B will be 
of great value in understanding the process of convergence. 
This book is recommended to anyone interested in understanding the present 
state and context of the world system should find Great Divergence and Great 
Convergence: A Global Perspective a very valuable read and a continual source of 
insight and information.  The specific aspects of this book that set it far apart from 
a simple narrative of change over time are the emphasis on continuous process, the 
multifaceted characteristics of that process, the threshold nature of some aspects of 
change, the breadth and depth of supporting data including the graphical 
representation of that data, and the melding of historical insight with the clarity of 
both verbal and mathematical models. Beyond this, the duo of authors have both 
the complementary and supplementary knowledge and expertise to present the 
topics covered in a very professional way. This book will make a valuable 
contribution to world system analysis in general and the specifics of the Great 
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